Stripe

IWhat it does

Stripe is not publicly traded. Its shares cannot be bought on a stock exchange, and the company does not publish audited accounts. A search of SEC EDGAR, the US filings database, shows only Form D notices for Stripe, Inc., which are short notices of private share sales, and no registration statement for a listing³. Everything below about its revenue and profit therefore comes from the company’s own letters, from press reports that cite unnamed sources, or from my own estimates. I label which is which.

In plain terms, Stripe is the software behind the checkout button. A business that wants to take card payments, bank transfers or digital wallets on its website or app plugs in Stripe’s code instead of building its own link to card networks and banks. Stripe says businesses using it generated $1.9 trillion in 2025, about 1.6% of world GDP, and that more than five million businesses use it directly or through platforms¹. It says it powers 90% of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and 80% of the Nasdaq 100, and that a quarter of new Delaware corporations are formed with its Atlas incorporation tool¹.

The company has grown well beyond card acceptance. Its letter lists billing and invoicing, tax, revenue recognition, fraud tools, business cards, lending, and a crypto and stablecoin stack (a stablecoin is a digital token meant to hold a fixed dollar value)². Stripe said stablecoin payment volume on its network roughly doubled to about $400 billion in 2025, with an estimated 60% of it between businesses, and that volume at Bridge, its stablecoin infrastructure unit, more than quadrupled¹. Press reports say Bridge has conditional approval from the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for a national trust bank charter, and that Tempo, a payments-focused blockchain built with Paradigm, went live on mainnet in March 2026. I could only see summaries of those two reports, not the full pages, so treat them as unconfirmed²⁰²¹.

Stripe has also been acquiring. It bought Bridge for about $1.1 billion, completed in February 2025²⁴, and then Privy in 2025 and Metronome in January 2026⁷. In August 2026 it agreed to buy OpenRouter, and press reports put the price above $7 billion¹⁶. I could not open a company or major-outlet source for that price, so I treat it as unverified. Separately, in July 2026 Stripe teamed up with the private equity firm Advent International on an offer for PayPal, covered in the risks section⁸.

IIHow it makes money

Stripe’s main income is a small cut of each payment it processes. A typical arrangement is a percentage plus a fixed fee per transaction, and part of that goes to the card networks and banks that sit behind the payment. What Stripe keeps after those costs is what it calls net revenue. It does not publish that number, but press reports put 2025 net revenue near $6.8 billion to $6.9 billion, up from about $5.1 billion in 2024¹²¹⁶. The third-party data provider that gives the $5.1 billion figure also shows a conflicting $3.8 billion for a 2024 data point on the same page, so the older history is not clean¹⁶.

Dividing my midpoint of $6.85 billion by the $1.9 trillion of volume gives a net take rate of about 0.36%. That is my own arithmetic, and it blends payments with software revenue, so it is only a rough guide. Adyen, a listed rival that reports cleanly, earned net revenue of EUR 1.30 billion on EUR 803.8 billion of volume in the first half of 2026, which is about 0.16% on the same sum⁴. The gap is real but the two businesses are built differently, and Stripe’s number includes subscriptions, tax, lending and other software lines.

The fastest-growing part of the mix appears to be software on top of payments. Stripe said its revenue suite, which includes Billing, is on track for a $1 billion annual run rate in 2026¹. A later letter to investors, reported by Seeking Alpha and Axios, said first-half 2026 net revenue grew 41% and free cash flow grew 43%, and that Billing grew 71%¹⁸. I could not open either page, so I rely on the summary and mark it press-reported.

On profit, Stripe says only that it "remained robustly profitable" in 2025¹. The Information, as relayed in a summary I could see, reported about $3.2 billion of free cash flow for 2025, which would be a margin of roughly 47% on my revenue midpoint²². MSCI’s note, which repeats third-party press, estimates EBITDA near $1.2 billion¹². These two figures measure different things and I do not reconcile them; the free cash flow number is much higher than EBITDA, which would be unusual and may reflect timing items such as money held for customers. I treat both as weak evidence and use a lower margin in my model.

Money figures, with who said them

IIIThe market and the competition

Stripe sells into the online payments market, which is large and still moving from cash and cards in stores to online and mobile. Its closest listed rival is Adyen, a Dutch company that serves large global merchants. In the first half of 2026 Adyen reported net revenue of EUR 1,302.9 million, up 19%, processed volume of EUR 803.8 billion, up 24%, and an EBITDA margin of 49%⁴. It guides to 21% to 23% net revenue growth for 2026 and a margin above 55% by 2028⁴. Stripe’s reported growth of 41% in the first half is faster, but off a base that is several times larger by net revenue on my numbers.

Other competitors differ by customer type. PayPal and its Braintree unit compete for checkout and for large merchants. Checkout.com, a private UK company, said in September 2026 that its annualised net revenue reached $750 million, up 28%, with about $150 million of expected 2026 adjusted EBITDA, and press put its latest internal valuation at $12 billion⁶¹⁴. Visa and Mastercard sit underneath almost all of these players as the card networks, and Visa’s results show how profitable that layer is: $45.9 billion of net revenue for its fiscal year to September 2026, up 15%, and operating income of about $28.1 billion, a margin near 61% by my arithmetic⁵. Stripe lives on top of that layer and shares its economics.

Shopify, Block and the big banks’ merchant-services arms also compete in parts of the market, and I have not sourced their current figures here. In each case the competition is less about whether a business can accept a card, which is now easy everywhere, and more about who owns the relationship with developers and who offers the most complete bundle of billing, tax, fraud and money movement.

New rails are the other pressure. If stablecoins or bank-to-bank payments (account-to-account) move a real share of volume, the card-network cost layer that Stripe sits on could shrink. Stripe is positioning for this with Bridge and Tempo¹²¹, but it also means the fee pool it earns from today is not guaranteed to look the same in ten years.

IVThe moat and how it could be disrupted

I rate the moat as strong, not fortress. Stripe has real advantages. Developers choose it first, so it is often the default for new companies; Stripe says new businesses formed in 2025 grew about 50% faster than the 2024 group and that 57% of new companies using it are based outside the US¹. Once a company has built subscriptions, tax and reporting on Stripe, moving is slow and risky. Scale also helps with fraud models, because more transactions mean more data on what bad payments look like.

But these advantages are less protected than a card network’s. Payment processing is a business where large merchants negotiate, and the switch cost for a big merchant is mostly engineering time, not a contract wall. Adyen is a credible alternative for large enterprises, with a higher reported margin⁴. If a few of Stripe’s biggest customers moved volume to a second processor, or built their own routing, the take rate on that volume could fall. Stripe’s net take rate on my estimate is more than double Adyen’s, which suggests the blended price Stripe earns is not low, and that could be pressured over time.

The fast-moving threats are on the edges. Stablecoins and account-to-account payments could cut card costs and reduce the value of owning the card-processing layer. AI agents buying on behalf of people could shift checkout from web pages to software, which gives a chance to Stripe but also to whoever controls the agent. Regulators could also change how processors are supervised. None of these is a sign of weakness today, but each is a way the position could be reduced.

VThe numbers we can see

The only audited, filed financial statements I could find for any comparable are for the listed peers. For Stripe itself, nothing is filed. The valuation history in the table below is from press and a data vendor, and the tender prices were set by the company and its investors, not by an open market.

The February 2026 tender offer valued Stripe at $159 billion. CNBC and Stripe’s own post do not say whether this is pre- or post-money, which matters less for a share sale between holders than for a new funding round, since a tender offer mostly moves existing shares between owners¹⁷. Thrive Capital, Coatue and a16z provided most of the money, and Stripe used some of its own capital to repurchase shares¹⁷. The prior tender in February 2025 was at $91.5 billion, so the price rose about 74% in a year while reported 2025 volume grew 34%⁷¹.

MSCI Private Company Insights estimated a secondary-market valuation of $185.96 billion on 12 October 2026, about 17% above the tender¹². That note says its revenue and EBITDA inputs come from third-party press, not the company, and that sell-side interest in Q3 was well above buy-side: asks were $5.93 billion against bids of $2.56 billion¹². I read that as saying more holders want to sell than to buy at current marks, but the note itself does not draw that conclusion and secondary quotes are thin. Also, a bid-ask mismatch does not always mean the price is wrong.

At $159 billion the price is about 23 times my 2025 net revenue midpoint and about 50 times the reported $3.2 billion of 2025 free cash flow, which is a free cash flow yield near 2% (my arithmetic on press-reported inputs)¹⁶²². For comparison, Adyen traded on 21 October at about 22.5 times trailing EBITDA and 26.1 times trailing earnings, with a market value of about EUR 29.7 billion, which is roughly 11 times its annualised first-half net revenue (my arithmetic)¹³⁴. Checkout.com’s $12 billion mark is about 16 times its $750 million annualised net revenue¹⁴⁶. Stripe is therefore priced at a clear premium to both on revenue, and has to earn that premium through faster growth.

Stripe valuation history and nearby marks

VIWho runs it and who owns it

Patrick Collison is chief executive and John Collison is president; the brothers founded Stripe¹⁵. They have held control of the company through every round I can see. In 2017 Patrick said Stripe would not go public soon and that being listed "does make it more difficult" to think long term¹⁷. In February 2026 John Collison said an IPO would be "a solution in search of a problem" and was not among the company’s top priorities⁷. That is consistent over nearly a decade.

I could not find a sourced breakdown of how much of the company the founders and the investors own, so I do not give one. Investors named in sources include Sequoia, General Catalyst, Andreessen Horowitz, Thrive Capital, Khosla Ventures, Founders Fund and Coatue¹⁶⁷. Total funding is shown as about $8.7 billion over 13 rounds on one data vendor page, which I cannot verify¹⁶.

For an outside owner, how much money can actually be taken out is the key question. Stripe reports no dividend that I can see. The route to cash for holders is the company’s own tender offers, which it chooses to run on its terms, and a stock exchange listing, which it says it does not need⁷. A holder of Stripe shares, directly or through a fund, depends on Stripe’s decisions about when to offer liquidity and at what price. That is a real cost compared with a listed share that can be sold on any trading day.

VIIValuation: is the last price supported?

Equity value in US$ billions. Not a share price: a private company has none. Latest mark: tender offer (secondary sale by employees and shareholders, with some company repurchase); pre- or post-money not stated.

What the last valuation assumes

At $159 billion, the price assumes net revenue of roughly $9.5 billion this year growing at 20% or more for several years after that, free cash flow margins in the mid-40s, and a buyer in 2030 willing to pay a premium multiple for a company that is by then large. It also assumes Stripe keeps its take rate against Adyen, Checkout.com and new payment rails. At the October secondary estimate of about $186 billion, it assumes more again.

Bear, base and bull

• Bear. Start from my 2025 net revenue midpoint of $6.85B (press-reported¹²¹⁶). Growth of 34%, 22%, 17%, 13% and 10% for 2026 to 2030, so 2030 revenue is about $16.3B. Free cash flow margin of 38% (below the 47% implied by the press-reported $3.2B, because I do not trust that figure). Exit at 14 times 2030 free cash flow, a discount to Adyen’s 26 times earnings and above PayPal’s roughly 10 times, since fee pressure has arrived. Discount rate 12%, dilution 2% a year. Result about $65B.
• Base. Growth of 38%, 28%, 23%, 19% and 16%, so 2030 revenue is about $20.5B; the 2026 rate is set a little below the reported 41% for the first half¹⁸. Free cash flow margin 44%. Exit at 22 times 2030 free cash flow, below Adyen’s 22.5 times EBITDA and 26.1 times earnings¹³ because Stripe should be larger and growing more slowly by then. Discount rate 11%, dilution 1.5% a year. Result about $144B.
• Bull. Growth of 41%, 34%, 29%, 25% and 21%, so 2030 revenue is about $25.3B, helped by billing, stablecoins and AI-agent payments. Free cash flow margin 48%. Exit at 27 times free cash flow, a premium to Adyen’s 26.1 times earnings¹³. Discount rate 10%, dilution 1% a year. Result about $242B.

Comparables used

Where I come down

The $159 billion tender price is about 10% above my base case of $144 billion, so I call it near to slightly above. The secondary estimate of about $186 billion is about 29% above my base, and the tender price is above my margin of safety figure of $108 billion. To justify $159 billion I would have to believe growth near my bull-case path for at least two more years, or that Stripe can earn a higher margin than the 44% I use. The market could be right even if this looks high: Stripe is reporting 41% growth at this size, it appears to be profitable, buyers in the tender were professional growth funds, and I am discounting a press-reported free cash flow figure that, if true, would make the business more valuable than I model. My model also leaves out Stripe’s cash balance and any value in Tempo, Bridge or OpenRouter. Against that, tender prices are set between willing insiders, secondary demand looks thin on the buy side per MSCI, and none of this is audited¹².

What I cannot judge

I cannot judge Stripe’s true net revenue, free cash flow, cash balance, customer concentration or ownership split, because none are filed. I cannot judge the effect of a PayPal deal on value, since the price and structure are unsettled, or the value of OpenRouter, because I could not verify its price. I cannot see sell-side or buy-side secondary pricing beyond one MSCI summary. The ranges are wide for these reasons: a reader should treat $65B to $242B as the honest spread, not any one point in it.

VIIIThe IPO

No IPO plan reported. No filing: EDGAR shows only Form D notices for Stripe, Inc., the latest dated 12 April 2024, and no S-1, draft registration or 10-K³. The company’s position is that a listing is not a priority: John Collison said in February 2026 that an IPO would be "a solution in search of a problem"⁷, and Patrick Collison said in 2017 that going public was not planned¹⁷. Press summaries of an August 2026 investor letter say the company sees staying private as best for now¹⁸. Some websites claim Stripe has filed or listed, including under a ticker; I found no filing or major-outlet report to support that and treat those claims as wrong. No exchange, ticker, banks or size are reported.

What to watch

• Any S-1 or confidential filing report from Reuters, Bloomberg or WSJ
• The next tender offer: timing, price and who funds it
• Whether a PayPal deal is signed, and how it is financed¹¹
• Any change in Collison language about staying private
• Whether Stripe publishes audited figures, which would be a step toward a listing

IXWhat could go wrong

What most likely hurts this business is not one dramatic failure. It is a slow squeeze on the share Stripe keeps from each payment, while the valuation assumes growth stays near 30% a year for several years. Large merchants push fees down, rival processors match features, and new payment rails reduce what a processor can charge. If that squeeze coincided with slower volume growth, the stock price implied by a revenue multiple of 23 times would be hard to hold.

The PayPal bid is a second risk. Reuters reported, and CNBC confirmed, that Stripe and Advent offered $60.50 per share in cash, valuing PayPal at $53.4 billion, with Stripe, Advent and Block contributing $17 billion of equity and about $50 billion of committed bank financing, and Stripe and Advent each owning half of the result⁸⁹. Bloomberg reported on 28 August that the group had dropped the pursuit after the PayPal board called the price too low¹⁰. The Wall Street Journal then reportedly said in October that talks had resumed at a higher price, with nothing final¹¹. A large, leveraged purchase of a slower-growing company is a different business from Stripe’s, and it would put real balance sheet risk onto a company that has not shown outside investors its accounts. If a deal happens I cannot judge the effect on value because the price, split of debt and equity and Stripe’s share are unknown.

There are other risks. Stripe’s financials are not audited in public, so a reader depends on numbers the company chooses to share. Regulators can change the rules for payment processors, including on banking access and crypto activity. Concentration in a few big customers is possible but Stripe does not disclose its customer mix. A broad fall in listed fintech valuations would also pull down what private buyers pay in secondary sales, as happened in 2022 when Stripe’s internal mark was reported at $74 billion against the $95 billion peak of 2021¹⁶.

What has to go right at the same time, in my judgement: volume growth stays strong (I put this at about 70%), margins hold near my base free cash flow margin of 44% as pricing pressure builds (about 70%), the exit multiple stays near 22 times free cash flow (about 55%), and big acquisitions such as PayPal or OpenRouter do not destroy value (about 85%). Multiplying gives about 23% for all four at once. These odds are my own rough judgement, not data, and the first two are linked, so the true figure could be higher or lower. The point is that a valuation near my base case already needs several things to go right.