Tiny Ltd

IThe business

Tiny is a holding company. It buys most or all of internet and software companies, keeps their managers, and takes the cash. It was founded in British Columbia in 2016 by Andrew Wilkinson and Chris Sparling, who had built a design agency called Metalab. It listed in April 2023, when WeCommerce, a company already trading on the TSX Venture Exchange, bought Tiny Capital in a reverse takeover and took its name.² The shares moved to the Toronto Stock Exchange on 1 October 2025, after an 8-for-1 consolidation. The ticker is TINY. The warrants trade as TINY.WT.²⁷

All company figures on this page are in Canadian dollars, marked C$, because that is how Tiny reports, under IFRS. About 68% of revenue in 2024 came from customers in the United States, 12% from Europe, 8% from Asia, 8% from Australasia and 4% from Canada C (calculated).¹³ So the business earns in US dollars and reports in Canadian ones. The US dollar was C$1.396 on 30 October.¹⁴ Tiny’s own conversion of the fund stake at 30 June was C$46.4M for US$32.7M, or 1.42.⁵ The twelve months, shown as LTM, run from July 2025 to June 2026. This page uses the second-quarter report, the latest filed. The third quarter is due in early November.

Hotjar is not a Tiny holding. I searched the 2025 annual information form, the 2024 annual report, the 2026 quarterly report, the 2024 circular and both shareholder letters, and the word appears in none of them. The holdings are in the table. Some are consolidated, which means their revenue, costs and debt sit inside Tiny’s numbers, with a minority share taken out. Others, the fund’s, are not consolidated at all.⁷²

Tiny reports three segments and a leftover. Digital Services is Metalab, Beam and HappyFunCorp, the agency work. Software and Apps is Serato and WeCommerce. Creative Platform is Dribbble and Creative Market. Other is the head office and two small companies.² The chart shows where the adjusted EBITDA came from in the first half. Software and Apps made 60% of the three operating segments’ total C (calculated). Digital Services has fallen by more than a third. The Creative Platform figure rests on one enterprise contract at Dribbble that the company calls one-time.⁵ Head office and Other lose C$6.3M in six months.

What sits outside the consolidated numbers

Tiny Fund I is where the confusion starts. It is a private fund, set up in 2020 with US$147.2M of commitments, that owns Letterboxd, AeroPress and four other companies.² Tiny put in about a fifth of the capital and owns half of the general partner, which earns 30% of gains above an 8% yearly hurdle, asset by asset, with no management fee. Wilkinson Ventures, the other holder in the general partner, has waived its share so far, so Tiny would keep all of it.⁹ The fund has no debt. Its revenue was US$51.3M in 2025, up from US$48.3M.⁹ The accounts show only Tiny’s interest, C$46.4M, as one line, plus distributions: C$2.7M in 2025.³

The fund interest is worth knowing for one more reason. If the C$46.4M were only the 21.41% of limited partner units, the whole fund would be worth C$217M, or about US$153M against US$147.2M of capital put in C (calculated). That is a modest gain after six years, with Letterboxd up nearly threefold in members.⁵ So I don’t think much carry has accrued, but Tiny does not say. The company calls the fund “less of a black box than it was”, and in my reading it still is one.⁹

The fund also holds shares in SpaceX. Metalab’s own venture fund, in which Tiny’s agency has a small partnership interest, held a stake in xAI that SpaceX acquired in February 2026. Once SpaceX listed, Tiny marked its piece at C$1.8M, a gain of C$1.9M over six months.⁶ It is small, and I treat it as another investment, not as a reason to own Tiny.

What changed in eighteen months

Three events remade the company. In 2024 it sold or shut several agencies and brought in a new CEO and CFO. In May 2025 it bought 66% of Serato for US$66M. And in 2026 it reset: a new CEO on 13 May, a second wave of job cuts, and a second-quarter loss of C$83.0M.¹³⁸¹²⁵ I will come back to each. For now the point is that the Tiny of June 2026 is a different mix of businesses from the Tiny of 2024. It has more recurring revenue, 34% against 20%, more debt, and fewer of the businesses it started with.²³

IIThe moat

A holding company has no moat of its own. What it has is the moats of the businesses inside it, and Tiny’s are uneven. I take them one at a time.

Serato. It is the best business Tiny owns. Serato makes the software many professional DJs use to play, and it is bundled with controllers from several hardware makers.⁷ Switching means relearning your whole library and set, and that keeps users. About 70% of its revenue recurs.⁵ Tiny paid 9.6 times adjusted EBITDA, which is reasonable for that kind of business.⁸ The risk is that the hardware makers control the doors. One of them, AlphaTheta, tried to buy Serato and, as reported, New Zealand’s competition regulator blocked it, which says how much a rival values it.¹⁵

Letterboxd. A social network for film, with 30.7M members and a culture around it. It is the closest thing in the fund to a network effect, and it is the part of the fund Tiny’s letter talks about most.⁵⁹ But Tiny owns about 13% of it C (calculated).

Metalab and the agencies. Metalab ranked seventh on Fast Company’s most innovative design companies list for 2026.³ Reputation brings clients, but not a lock on them. Agency revenue falls when clients cut budgets, and it did: segment revenue was down 18% in the second quarter, partly because Z1 was sold and a large customer contract ended.² The reputation is real; the moat is thin.

WeCommerce and Creative Market. Here is what the filings say. The company wrote WeCommerce down by C$54.3M, because merchants spend less and the Shopify app and theme store has become more crowded.⁶⁹ Its apps depend on one platform and on Shopify’s rules. Creative Market sells fonts and graphics, which AI can now make, and Tiny put C$26.4M of write-down into it, leaving no goodwill.⁶ I would not call either a moat today.

The company itself. Tiny’s website says the company is a buyer for owners who want to keep their people and not be sold to private equity.¹⁰ That is a real position, and the founders’ reputation among builders helps. It does not stop anyone else from paying more.

The scorecard is simple. Of the five units that matter for cash, two have moats, one has a reputation and two are under attack. The moat is in the best assets and weakest in the places where Tiny just lost C$80.7M.⁶

IIIThe competitive advantage

The question for a buyer of small businesses is not whether it can find good ones. It is whether it can buy them at a lower price than the next buyer, keep them with cheaper money, and run them no worse. I looked at each in turn.

Price. Tiny pays what it pays. Serato was 3.2 times annualized revenue and 9.6 times adjusted EBITDA.⁸ Letterboxd came in through the fund and its founders put money into Tiny itself, buying 1,430,346 shares at C$3.40, or C$27.20 after the consolidation.⁷ That is not a bargain price for a company whose own shares are now C$6.06. The edge here is that sellers can keep running things and are not asked to take earn-outs. Tiny’s site has comparison pages against brokers, private equity, strategic buyers and rivals such as saas.group, which I take as its own account of the edge.¹⁰ I could not check how many deals it wins.

Cost of money. This is the weak part. Tiny’s secured convertible debentures pay 11% a year and were sold at 92.5 cents on the dollar, which lifts the real cost higher still.⁶ Interest was C$6.5M in the first half on roughly C$140M of borrowing, about 9% a year including the convertible C (calculated).⁶ A buyer paying 9 to 10 times EBITDA with money at that price needs growth to make anything. That is why the company says it wants to cut leverage first.⁵

Running them. The letter says plainly that centralizing operations was tested and dropped, and that “the easy growth available in previous years is behind us” in WeCommerce.⁹ Tiny’s model is to leave businesses alone. That works when the business is good and the founder stays. When the market turns, as it did for Shopify apps, a head office with no operating role finds out late. Tiny’s own letter lists “some portfolio assumptions proved too optimistic” among its lessons.⁹

Against the field. On this site Prosus is the nearest comparison for a holding company with a discount, and Berkshire Hathaway for one that compounds by buying whole businesses. Both buy with far cheaper money, and both are far larger. I put the comparison later, in Valuation.

So the advantage is real but small: a name that founders trust, and a record of picking Serato and Letterboxd. The disadvantages are cost of capital, a share price that cannot be used to buy anything, and a portfolio in which the two oldest software units have just lost a large part of their value.

IVManagement

Austin Singhera became chief executive on 13 May 2026. He joined Tiny in 2020, led the Serato, Letterboxd and MediaNet deals, and replaces Jordan Taub, who had been CEO since June 2024.¹² Andrew Wilkinson became executive chairman and Chris Sparling executive vice-chairman. Wilkinson called it “founder mode” and said he and Sparling would be deeper in strategy, capital allocation and the use of AI.¹² Mike McKenna has been chief financial officer since July 2024.⁷ So in two years Tiny has had two founders as co-CEOs, then Taub, then Singhera, with the founders back in. That is not a stable seat.

How they are paid, and what that pays them to do

The founders own most of the company. At the date of the annual information form directors and officers held 17,356,090 shares, 59.1% of the total. Wilkinson alone held 14,995,680, or 51.0%, and Sparling 2,268,710, or 7.7%.⁷ The letter says this is the “vast majority” of their net worth.⁹ That is the best incentive in the file, because it is their own money. It also means the other 41% has no vote that matters.

Their pay is small by comparison. In the 2024 circular, the latest I could open, Sparling received C$500,000 a year and Wilkinson C$500,000, split between him and a company he controls.¹¹ The 2026 circular was not available to me, so I don’t know what changed with the new titles. The new CEO received a C$2.0M signing bonus, which under his contract was used to buy shares through an automatic plan.² Stock options expired unused on 31 December 2025, and 669,282 restricted share units are outstanding, about 2.3% of the shares.⁶² These awards are modest, and stock pay is not a large drain: C$0.1M in the first half of 2026.⁶ I count it as a cost anyway.

What does that pay them to do? Own more of a company whose shares go up, which is fine. But with 51% owned by one person, there is a second incentive. Wilkinson set up an automatic disposition plan in September 2024.⁷ His holding fell from about 15.18M shares, after the consolidation, in the May 2024 circular to 14.996M in the annual information form, a drop of about 182,000 shares, or 1.2% C (calculated).¹¹⁷ That fits sales under the plan. I could not open the insider filings and don’t know the prices. It is small, and it is one more fact to weigh.

What they did with capital over a cycle

Since the April 2023 merger Tiny has sold shares at each of the prices in the table below, bought Serato in 2025 with cash, debt and stock, and added an 11% convertible. The share count rose from 23.43M at the end of 2024 to 29.41M a year later, up 25.5%, mostly for Serato and the April raise.⁶ The price is C$6.06. Every placement at C$9.20 or above is under water. The Serato deal, the biggest, looks fine so far on adjusted EBITDA, which rose 54% in Software and Apps, but it was done as WeCommerce and Creative Market were weakening.⁵ Buybacks have been tiny, C$1.1M in 2025 and C$0.8M in the first half of 2026, against C$20M raised at C$9.20 a year ago.⁹⁶ The company says its shares are undervalued.³ It spent little to act on it, because it has debt to pay.

What I would want to know and can’t

Three things bother me. First, the board found its internal controls over financial reporting not effective at the end of 2025, citing journal-entry monitoring, spreadsheets and access to financial systems.² The company is fixing it, and the same filing says so. But Tiny just wrote down C$80.7M, and I want that to be right. Second, C$1.8M of promissory notes from Atomic Developments Inc., an equity-accounted company, were written off in the second quarter.⁶ The filing does not say who owns Atomic, and I have not found out. Third, three of five directors are called independent, but one of them, Carla Matheson, was chief financial officer of Tiny Capital from 2017 to 2021.⁷ Neither of these is damning. They are things a controlling holder owes an explanation for.

The letter is candid. It says 2026 “will likely be a harder year than 2025 to explain”, and that the founders “have been disappointed by the share price performance”.⁹ I give that credit. It is rare in a shareholder letter. Candour is not the same as a good result, though, and the record since 2023 is a falling share price, a rising share count, and a CEO seat that has changed hands twice.

VFinancials

Five years of results are hard to compare because Tiny kept changing. The first two columns belong to the predecessor, Tiny Capital, before it merged with WeCommerce. The 2023 year has WeCommerce only after 17 April. Serato joined on 12 May 2025. I show the figures as filed and point out where they break.¹³²

Revenue and where it comes from

Revenue grew from C$110.8M in 2021 to C$203.8M in 2025, and was C$208.7M over the last twelve months.¹³³² Most of that was bought. Without the divested companies, the company says, 2025 revenue grew 12%.³ But organic revenue, the measure that leaves out acquisitions and currency, fell 4% in the second quarter, because WeCommerce and Digital Services shrank.⁵ Recurring revenue is the real change. It was 20% of revenue in 2024 and 34% in the second quarter of 2026, almost all through Serato.² That deserves a better multiple, and it also hides the fact that non-recurring revenue, agency work and marketplaces, fell.

Profit, and what the adjustments hide

Adjusted EBITDA rose from C$27.4M in 2023 to C$37.9M in 2025 and C$39.8M over twelve months.¹³³² It is the company’s own figure, and the company’s own letter says it has “made peace with it, but have not fully invited it over for the holidays”.⁹ I keep a closer eye on what it leaves out. Over the last four quarters Tiny added back C$7.3M of cash costs: severance, restructuring, deal costs and public-company costs C (calculated). Severance shows up in every one of the last eight quarters.² A cost that recurs for eight quarters is a cost.

Net income is a mess. 2025 had a loss of C$33.8M, 2024 a loss of C$47.6M, and the first half of 2026 a loss of C$93.2M, nearly all of it the second-quarter impairment of C$80.7M, plus foreign exchange on US dollar debt, executive-transition costs and the write-off of a customer receivable and the Atomic notes.³⁵⁶ Impairments are non-cash, but they say something: management paid for or built these businesses for more than it now thinks they are worth. Goodwill and intangibles were C$245.7M at 30 June, against equity attributable to shareholders of C$84.8M C (calculated).⁶ There is no tangible book value.

Cash, which is the number that matters

Free cash flow was C$25.3M in 2025 and C$13.4M over the last twelve months on the new attributable basis.³² Both numbers look healthier than they are. In the third quarter of 2025 Tiny received C$8.2M from a one-time licence of a trademark, which is most of the reason that quarter’s free cash flow was C$13.7M.⁴² Take it out and the last twelve months produced C$5.1M. Add the C$2.8M of distributions from the fund, which the accounts show separately, and an owner could take about C$7.9M, or C$0.26 a share C (calculated). At C$6.06 that is a yield of 4.4%.

The gap between C$39.8M and C$7.9M is the central fact on this page. Interest takes C$11.1M. Minorities take C$5.7M. The one-time payment is not repeatable. And working capital took C$4.1M in the first half of 2026 alone.⁶ Management says this will improve, because it expects the savings from the WeCommerce cuts to be more visible over the coming quarters.⁵ I give it some credit in the base case, but I note that the first half of 2026 gave shareholders C$0.2M of free cash flow in total.²

Debt and what stands ahead of the shareholders

Tiny’s debt sits at three levels. The head office owes the convertibles and a Scotiabank facility. Beam owes the National Bank. WeCommerce owes JPMorgan. The two operating facilities are not guaranteed by the parent, the letter says.⁹ That limits the damage if one of them fails. It also means a lender to WeCommerce can look at WeCommerce alone, which was just written down by C$54.3M.⁶ The company put the ratio of net debt to adjusted EBITDA at 2.8 times, above its target of 2.0 to 2.5 times.⁵⁹ My own arithmetic gives 110.4 over 39.8, or 2.8 times C (calculated).

On 30 June the company renegotiated the JPMorgan loan. It cut the revolver from US$20M to US$10M, the term loan from US$27.25M to US$21.875M, extended both to 31 December 2027 and tightened what it must repay: US$0.5M a quarter until the end of 2026 and US$1.375M after that.⁶ In April it moved the National Bank revolver at Beam from May 2027 to May 2028.⁶ These are extensions of a year or two. They are not refinancings, and the real test comes at the end of 2027 and in May 2028, when both come due within five months of each other, in the same year the Serato earn-out of up to US$15M falls due in cash. I come back to this in Valuation.

VIValuation

First, how this goes badly

Before the numbers, I asked what would most likely ruin the investment, and worked back. Three things stand out.

• The loans come due before the businesses recover. The JPMorgan loan at WeCommerce matures on 31 December 2027, with a coverage covenant that tightens to 1.15 times from the end of this year. The National Bank revolver at Beam, C$58.0M, runs to 20 May 2028. The 11% convertible is due in 2030.⁶ Lenders now look harder at software that AI can attack, as the letter says.⁹ If they will not extend on the same terms, Tiny has to raise equity at a low price, sell a good business, or give lenders a bigger share. A C$40M raise at C$3.50 takes my base from C$4.43 to C$4.17 C (calculated).
• The weak parts shrink faster than the good parts grow. WeCommerce and Creative Market assumed revenue falling by up to 22% and 14% a year in the impairment test, and the company said it expects the difficult environment at WeCommerce to continue.⁶⁹ Agency revenue fell 18%. If that spreads, Serato’s growth, which I put at perhaps 8% a year, cannot carry the total.
• Value leaks before it reaches common shareholders. Minority holders take C$5.7M a year of cash. The earn-out takes up to US$15M in cash. The put takes C$12.9M or more. The convertible takes 11% a year. And the controlling holder can issue shares, as the company did at C$21.44 and C$9.20, when it needs money.⁶⁷ Each is reasonable alone. Together they are a long queue ahead of me.

None of these needs a new event. They set the bear case. They also explain why I begin with cash a shareholder can take, and don’t just apply a multiple to EBITDA.

How I built it

I work from the cash the operating companies make after everything that must leave before a shareholder sees it. Adjusted EBITDA, 100% of the subsidiaries, starts from twice the first-half 2026 figure of C$19.9M, which is C$39.7M.² I take off cash tax at 20% of EBITDA, which fits the C$4.0M paid in six months, capital spending and leases of C$2.0M, the minority share at 18% of what is left, and the cash costs the company adds back, C$5M in 2027 falling to C$3M.⁶ What remains is cash that pays the lenders and the owners. I discount it from 1 July 2026, ten years, then a value after that. I subtract the senior debt, the convertibles at face, the earn-out, the put and the refinancing cost where there is one, and add cash. The fund and other investments are added at book, adjusted by case. Interest is not in the flows, because the debt is taken off the total. Share count is 29.31M plus 678,000 restricted and deferred units, 29.99M. The warrants and convertibles are out of the money above C$11.60 and C$12.00, and I leave them out; in my bull case the value does not reach either.²

One note on the debts. WeCommerce’s and Beam’s loans are not guaranteed by Tiny.⁹ So the equity in each cannot fall below zero for Tiny’s other holders; they can simply be abandoned. A consolidated bear that nets every debt against every value therefore overstates the loss somewhat. I did not model it separately, because I can’t split the operating value by company, and none of my bears pushes WeCommerce or Beam below their own debt on my reading of the impairment note E (estimate).

What the price implies

At C$6.06, Tiny has a market value of C$177.6M. Add the claims of C$142.1M and the enterprise value is C$319.7M, which is 8.0 times last year’s adjusted EBITDA C (calculated). That looks cheap. It is not so cheap when you remember that adjusted EBITDA was C$39.8M and underlying free cash flow was C$5.1M, or C$7.9M with the fund’s distributions. I asked what the price needs.

At 12% the price needs EBITDA to grow 4.3% a year for ten years. Organic revenue is falling 4%.⁵ Or it needs a discount rate of 10.2% on my base path, which is a rate I would apply to a steadier business with no maturities in 2027. Or it needs EBITDA to be C$47M today, 18% more than it is. The market’s price is not absurd. It is the price of a business that gets through 2027 and starts to grow again, with Serato carrying the rest.

Now the parts

The usual test for a holding company is whether it trades below its parts, so I added them. This is not my main value. It is a cross-check, using the anchors the company and the Serato deal give me.

Serato is the deal valuation: 9.6 times its adjusted EBITDA, which I annualize from C$10.7M for nine months to C$14.3M, or C$137M for all of it C (calculated).⁸ WeCommerce is the amount management says it can recover in its impairment test, C$118.2M, on assumptions of 16% before tax, falling revenue and a 31% to 32% margin.⁶ Creative Market is C$27.2M on the same test.⁶ Digital Services is 16.8M of annualized EBITDA at 6 times, my choice for agency work E (estimate). Dribbble is a guess of C$20M, because Tiny gives no value for it E (estimate). Head office and Other cost C$12.7M a year, which I treat as a cost worth 6 times. The Fund is its book value of C$46.4M and the other investments C$11.1M.²⁶ The low and high columns move each by my judgement.

On these anchors the mid value is C$6.77, and the price is 10% under it. The low and high are C$2.81 and C$10.19. So the price is about 10% under the parts at management’s values, a small holding-company discount, and well above the parts at my cash-based value. Which one is right? I can’t tell from outside. The deal values were set in March 2025, before the AI scare in software lending and before Shopify apps weakened. The WeCommerce value is management’s own test, in which it also gave the number that triggered an impairment. And the sum counts EBITDA at multiples that ignore the 20% cash tax and the one-offs. My value is lower, C$4.43, because it counts cash. The truth is probably between, and the price is inside the range of both.

What I can’t judge

Three inputs decide this page. I can’t know the course of EBITDA in WeCommerce, Creative Market and the agencies. I can’t know whether the lenders will extend in 2027. And I can’t know what carry has built up in the fund. Here is how the value moves with the first.

A one-point change in the rate moves the base by C$0.56 to C$1.03. A two-point change in yearly EBITDA growth moves it by about C$1.10 to C$1.20. Those are large, because the equity is about half of the total after the claims.

The discount rate

I use 12% for everything. The ten-year Government of Canada bond yields 3.84%.¹⁸ A standard beta for Tiny is useless: the share trades thinly, and the quote page shows a beta of minus 0.41, which says the shares have not moved with the market and nothing about risk.¹⁶ I anchor on two facts instead. First, the company’s own impairment tests for WeCommerce and Creative Market used rates before tax of 16% and 18%, about 12% and 13.3% after a tax rate near 26%, which is my assumption E (estimate).⁶ Second, Tiny’s lenders asked 11% a year for the convertible, with an issue discount on top, and shareholders ranking below them will ask for more.⁶ So 12% is a floor in my view, not a conservative number. I use one rate in all three cases, so the cases differ by what happens to the business, and not by a bigger discount.

Three cases

A rough check on the fund. Letterboxd, AeroPress and the rest are carried by the equity method, and Tiny’s share is C$46.4M. At my case values it is worth C$1.38 a share in the bear, C$1.92 in the base and C$2.53 in the bull, 23% to 42% of the price C (calculated). That part is the most tangible piece of Tiny. It is also the one Tiny has said it would consider monetizing.⁹

Other uses of the same dollar

The ten-year Government of Canada bond pays 3.84% with no risk to the money R (reported).¹⁸ From today’s price to my mid-2036 values, the base returns 8.7% a year, the bull 14.8% and the bear loses 3.0% a year E (estimate). The base value is reached by discounting at 12%; the rate that makes the price on my base cash flows is 10.2%, below the 12% I ask C (calculated). On this site, Prosus is a holding company with a large stake inside, and it trades 22% below my base value there; Tiny is 37% above my base value here. Berkshire Hathaway is 16% above its base. Those pages use their own dates and rates and the measures are not the same, so I show it as a reminder of the alternative, not a ranking. On my numbers Tiny sits on the other side of that line.

The margin of safety

• PriceC$6.06Close, Q4 2026 [17][16][19]
• Base valueC$4.43My estimate E (estimate)
• Margin of safety belowC$2.01set from my bear case C (calculated)

I set the margin of safety from the bear case, because with this much debt a discount to base is no protection. Below C$2.01, 55% under my base, the bear value of C$1.51 is at least three quarters of the price paid. The 52-week low was C$4.63.¹⁶ C$2.01 is far below it, and I don’t expect to see it offered. At C$6.06 there is no margin of safety on my numbers.

Two different questions

How good is the business, and how good is the price? On the first, Tiny owns a few very good companies, such as Serato and Letterboxd, an agency with a good reputation, and two software businesses in trouble, under a controlling holder who has stayed through all of it. It is a decent company with a bad balance sheet and a hard 2027. On the second, the price is above my base, and below the sum of the parts if I trust management’s values. This looks like an ordinary business at a price that already assumes some recovery, with the risk concentrated on lenders and a controlling holder. A lower share price does not change that on its own, though another fall to the margin-of-safety level would.

Where this could be in 5 and 10 years

For the base to stand at five years, adjusted EBITDA must grow about 2% a year to C$43M, cash one-offs must settle at C$3M, and the C$142M of claims, grown at 7% and net of C$111M of owner cash kept by then, must be down to C$88M. The fund must grow 5% a year. At ten years the base also needs its value after 2036, which is nearly all of the operating value then, and which assumes 2% growth at 12% E (estimate).

The bear and the bull differ on a few numbers. The bear has EBITDA falling to C$33M, one-offs at C$5M, no Serato put and a fund worth three quarters of book. The bull has EBITDA near C$62M by 2036, one-offs at C$2.5M and a fund 35% above book. The gap grows from C$5.66 a share today to C$10.71 at five years and C$18.49 at ten C (calculated).

The most likely way the base is wrong is the kept cash. My base lets about C$306M pile up and retire debt, and that is a decision a controlling holder makes, not me. If instead it goes into acquisitions that earn the 12% I ask, the value is about the same. If it goes into deals at today’s prices with 11% money, it is lower. At 13% instead of 12% the base is C$3.75 today, not C$4.43 C (calculated).

These are estimates of value, not forecasts of the share price. The market price can sit above or below value for years.

VIIThe case for the price

What most people miss

Three things cut in Tiny’s favour and get less attention than the write-down. First, the fund’s carry belongs to Tiny. Wilkinson Ventures has waived its half of the general partner’s share, Tiny’s letter says, and the letter expects that to continue.⁹ If Letterboxd, AeroPress and the others keep growing, a share of gains above an 8% yearly hurdle flows to Tiny with no matching fee. I give it no separate value, because Tiny doesn’t say how much has accrued. Second, Serato’s growth is bigger than it looks. Software and Apps adjusted EBITDA rose 54% in the second quarter to C$7.3M, even with WeCommerce shrinking.⁵ Third, the new CEO is buying. His C$2.0M bonus went into shares, directors and officers hold 59.1%, and the company has bought back shares at C$6.46 to C$10.00.²⁷⁶

The bull case

The bull case is that 2026 is the clean-up and 2027 is the benefit. Singhera called the second quarter “deliberately a clean-up quarter”, said forecasts had been reset on “a more conservative footing”, and listed priorities as better cash conversion, less leverage and careful use of capital.⁵ Wilkinson called the new set-up “founder mode” in May.¹² The company said in March that it believes its shares are undervalued.³ An aggregator lists an average analyst target of C$9.75; I did not see the notes and cannot say who wrote them.¹⁶ I found no named fund with a stated view on Tiny, so I name none.

Against reality

Some of it is true now. Adjusted EBITDA rose 29% to C$10.6M in the quarter, recurring revenue is 34% of the total, the fund interest rose 4% to C$46.4M, and debt fell by C$1.0M net of currency in the quarter.⁵ Against that, organic revenue fell 4%, free cash flow for the half was C$0.2M, and debt rose to C$142.0M from C$134.8M.⁵²

If adjusted EBITDA rises about 4% a year for ten years, if the WeCommerce loan is extended in 2027 on similar terms, if Creative Market stops shrinking, if cash one-offs fall to C$3M and there is no new equity, then C$6.06 is possible. Today, against that list, the score is: the first part of the cost cuts has been made, and the other four have not been shown. Multiply it out. The loans extend on similar terms: 75%, my guess, given they were extended twice this year. WeCommerce and Creative Market stabilize within two years: 40%. Serato grows near 8% and earns the full earn-out: 65%. No new equity at under C$6: 70%. Together that is about 14% E (estimate). They overlap, since a good year helps all four, so perhaps 20%. The 25% I give the bull is, if anything, generous.

What a 10x would take. Ten times C$6.06 is C$60.60, a market value of C$1.78B. With the claims of C$142M net of investments, that is an enterprise value near C$1.9B. At 12 times EBITDA it needs about C$155M of EBITDA, against C$39.8M now, almost four times as much C (calculated). By 2036 that is about 14.6% growth a year for ten years. Revenue grew about 15% a year from 2021 to the last twelve months, but that was bought with debt and new shares, and organic revenue is now falling.¹³⁵ For a company of about C$180M in market value, tenfold in ten years has happened, but it is rare, and Tiny’s shares are down 84% since the merger. I think it is close to impossible without big, well-priced deals, and I would not build anything on it.

Where I come down

The cash bridge moved me: C$7.9M of owner cash against C$39.8M of adjusted EBITDA is why I stay below the price. The parts did not, since management’s values and the Serato multiple were set before the problems at WeCommerce and Creative Market, and nothing has tested them in a sale. A signed extension of the 2027 loans and two quarters of positive organic growth would raise my values most; one more point of EBITDA growth a year adds about C$0.60 to the base C (calculated).

VIIIRisks, and what would change my view

The three ways this goes badly wrong are at the start of Valuation. These are the rest.

• One platform. WeCommerce sells to Shopify merchants, and Shopify’s terms, listings and fees are outside its control. The risk list names reliance on Shopify.⁷
• AI. The letter puts Creative Market “much closer to the blast radius” and describes merchants cutting app subscriptions.⁹ Dribbble and the agencies are not immune.
• Control. Wilkinson holds 51.0% and the two founders 58.7%, so no one can overrule them and a take-private or a large share issue would need their consent.⁷ The stock trades in small size, about 5,400 shares on 30 October, so selling is slow C (calculated).¹⁶
• Impairment again. After this quarter the recoverable amounts equal the carrying amounts, so, the note says, any adverse change in a key assumption could lead to a further charge. The goodwill left at WeCommerce is C$31.3M.⁶
• Controls. The board found internal control over financial reporting not effective at the end of 2025, with remediation under way.²
• Currency. About 68% of revenue comes from US customers, and some debt is in US dollars too: the JPMorgan term loan was US$21.9M after the amendment.¹³⁶
• The fund. Tiny’s share is stated at net asset value from a private fund, with no market price and a general partner owned half by the founders’ company.⁶
• Dilution. There are 669,282 restricted units, 8.7M warrants for 1.09M shares at C$11.60, a convertible for up to 3.01M shares at C$12.00, and up to 625,000 shares in the Serato earn-out.²⁶
• Serato’s partners. Serato depends on hardware makers for bundles and on Spotify and Apple Music for streaming.⁷⁹

Geopolitical risk, and what it means for the value

Tiny’s exposure is mostly to people and currencies, not to supply chains. It is a Canadian company. Its 2024 accounts list operations in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Spain, Serato adds New Zealand, and the Spanish studio was sold in April 2026. In 2024 68% of revenue came from US customers C (calculated).¹³⁷² Its products are software and services. The goods in the portfolio, AeroPress and Mateina, sit in the fund, and I could not confirm where AeroPress is made, so I model nothing for it. I found nothing in the filings about sanctions, export controls, state ownership, capital controls or a Chinese holding structure. That leaves three channels.

Trade and the border. The annual information form warns that the US keeps tariffs on Canadian exports and that Canada has retaliated. It records the US Supreme Court’s ruling of 20 February 2026 against some tariffs, and the administration’s stated intent to impose others.⁷ Tariffs on goods barely touch Tiny. A rupture in Canada-US trade that makes US clients cut agency and design budgets would.

Currency. Revenue is mostly in US dollars and costs are partly Canadian. A stronger Canadian dollar cuts reported EBITDA, and part of that is offset by US-dollar debt and the fund’s US-dollar value. The rate is 1.396 Canadian dollars to the US dollar; the figures here are in Canadian dollars.¹⁴

One platform. WeCommerce sells apps and themes to Shopify merchants, and the annual information form lists reliance on Shopify as a risk. Shopify’s fees, listings and own tools are outside Tiny’s control, and the C$54.3M write-down shows it already costs money.⁷⁶ This is a company risk more than a country risk, but it is the one the filings name most clearly.

Rates and credit. The two swaps on the US-dollar term loan ended in April 2026, so that debt now floats, and the loans fall due in December 2027 and May 2028.⁶ A shock does not hit Tiny’s products. It raises what lenders and shareholders ask, just as Tiny needs to refinance.

None of this is in the price. The price is above even my base, so it already assumes the world goes mostly right.