Ferrari

IThe business

Ferrari designs and builds sports cars in Maranello, near Modena, and sells them through 195 dealer points of sale in more than 60 markets.⁵ It also runs Scuderia Ferrari in Formula 1, a sponsorship and licensing business, and a small lifestyle line of clothes, stores and experiences. Cars and spare parts were €6,005M of €7,146M of revenue in 2025, 84% C (calculated). Sponsorship, commercial and brand income was €820M, up 22%.⁵

The company was part of Fiat for most of its life. Fiat bought half in 1969 and 90% in 1988, the year Enzo Ferrari died. Ferrari listed in New York in October 2015 and in Milan in January 2016, after Fiat Chrysler spun it out to its own shareholders.⁵ Exor, the Agnelli family holding company, still owns 21.3% of the shares and 32.3% of the votes, and Piero Ferrari, Enzo’s son, controls another 10.7% and 16.2%.⁵

What it sells

Ferrari splits its cars into four groups. Range models are the regular line, nine of them at the end of 2025, from the Roma Spider and the new Amalfi to the Purosangue, its first four-door car. Special Series are harder, faster versions of a Range car, sold for a few years. Icona cars are limited runs that borrow from old designs; the Daytona SP3 ended in the third quarter of 2025. Supercars come about once a decade; the F80 started shipping in the fourth quarter of 2025.⁵ For 2026 to 2030 the plan is more than 85% Range by volume, about 10% Special Series and under 5% Icona and Supercar.¹⁵

The small groups matter more than their volume. Icona and Supercar cars sell at much higher prices and margins than the rest, and customers pay deposits years ahead. That is why profit can jump while shipments fall. In the first half of 2026 shipments fell 4% to 6,802 and operating profit rose 5%, helped by the F80.¹³

Two lines stand out. The United States took 24.9% of cars and 28% of cars and parts revenue in 2025, and since 1 August 2025 those cars pay a 15% import tariff, up from 2.5% before March 2025.⁵ Ferrari’s cost of sales in the first half of 2026 names higher US tariffs as one cause of a €105M rise.¹⁴ China went the other way. Mainland China fell from 1,221 cars in 2023 to 584 in 2025, down 52% C (calculated), and Ferrari says the region will be a limited part of growth in the short term.⁵

How the money is made

Ferrari earns more per car each year, and it does this by mix more than by volume. Cars and spare parts revenue per car shipped was €375,000 in 2023, €417,000 in 2024 and €440,000 in 2025 C (calculated).⁷⁵ Every car is personalized, and personalization was above 20% of cars and parts revenue in the first half of 2026, by management’s account on the second-quarter call.⁵²² Paint, carbon fibre, wheels and leather cost little to add and are priced like jewellery.

The 2025 capital markets day put a number on the model. From 2024 to 2030 management expects about €0.9B of extra operating profit from mix and price, €0.3B from volume and the rest eaten by costs, research, marketing and currency, for operating profit of at least €2.75B in 2030 on revenue of about €9.0B.¹⁵ Volume is the smallest lever by design.

The order book is the asset nobody sees on the balance sheet. Management said in July 2026 that orders cover all of 2027.¹³ The balance sheet does show one part of it: €747M of customer advances and security deposits at June 2026, mostly for limited models, plus €701M of deferred income.¹⁴

IIThe moat

Ferrari is protected by a rationed brand, and the rationing is the protection. Ferrari says plainly that it keeps volumes low compared with demand and manages waiting lists to protect exclusivity, and that it does not regard market share as a key measure.⁵ Most car makers fight for share. Ferrari turns demand away, and that keeps prices firm and second-hand values high, which in turn keeps buyers coming back.

Three pieces hold it together. First, allocation: Ferrari decides which dealer and which client gets which car, using the client’s history, the dealer’s order book and local waiting times.⁵ A buyer who wants an F80 or a Special Series has usually bought Range cars before. Second, residual value: the 20-F calls resale value a strong competitive advantage, because a car that holds its price costs less to own and leads to the next purchase.⁵ Third, racing: Scuderia Ferrari has raced in every Formula 1 season since 1950, with 16 constructors’ and 15 drivers’ titles, though the last title was in 2008.¹³⁵

How wide, and against whom

Against other car makers the protection is wide. Ferrari had 24% of its historic segment, two-door cars above 500 horsepower and €200,000, across its 25 largest markets in 2025, and 18% once four-door cars are counted.⁵ Its main rivals are Lamborghini, McLaren, Aston Martin, Rolls-Royce and Bentley, with Porsche, Mercedes and Land Rover in some segments.⁵ None of them has shown Ferrari’s mix of volume control and margin, and the numbers in section III make that plain.

Against its own customers it is narrower than it looks. A Ferrari is a want, never a need, and the buyers are the wealthiest people in the world. When their mood turns, as it did after 2008, the industry shrinks. Ferrari has been more stable than rivals, and its own filing says it believes that is because volumes stay low relative to demand and launches come often.⁵ But rationing protects price only while the waiting list is longer than the supply. That is the one thing to watch.

Electric cars are the open question. Ferrari revealed its first electric car, the Luce, in Rome in May 2026, at €550,000, and the shares fell sharply the next day: more than 8% at the worst point, by one press account, and nearer 6% at the close by others. I did not check the closing move myself.²¹ Vigna told reporters that clients had already sent bank transfers.²¹ I cannot judge whether an electric Ferrari keeps the brand’s pull. Nobody can yet. Management calls the line-up, now combustion, hybrid and electric, the most complete in Ferrari’s history, and the 2030 plan was set on current emissions rules.¹³¹⁵

IIIThe competitive advantage

Ferrari’s advantage is price per car and the margin it leaves. It is not scale. Porsche shipped 20 times as many cars in 2025 and earned a fifth as much operating profit C (calculated).²⁸⁵

The useful comparison is Lamborghini, which builds a similar number of cars. Ferrari took €524,000 of revenue per car shipped in 2025; Lamborghini €298,000 per car delivered C (calculated).⁵²⁷ The two ratios are not the same measure, since Ferrari’s total includes racing and sponsorship, but the gap is too large to be an accounting difference. Lamborghini’s profitability slipped in 2025.²⁷ Ferrari’s rose. Porsche is the warning from the same industry: a sports car maker of great reputation whose operating profit fell 93% in a single year, helped by tariffs and the cost of a strategy reset.²⁸

The comparison Ferrari prefers is with luxury goods, and the numbers support it more than they support the car comparison. Hermès earned a 41.0% recurring operating margin in 2025.²⁹ Ferrari’s EBITDA margin, before depreciation, was 38.8%, and its target is at least 40% by 2030.⁵¹⁵ The difference is capital. A handbag workshop needs little of it. A car company needs a new model every few months, and Ferrari spent €943M on capital projects in 2025, 13.2% of revenue C (calculated).⁵

Where the advantage comes from

• Pricing power on new launches. Each new model starts at a higher price than the one it replaces, the 20-F says, and that has offset higher material costs since the pandemic.⁵
• Personalization. Options are a high-margin add-on to every car, and they grew faster than expected in 2026.¹³²²
• Deposits. Customers pay ahead for limited cars, which funds part of the working capital. Advances and security deposits rose from €554M to €775M during 2025, mostly for the F80.⁵
• Racing as marketing. Ferrari spends on Formula 1 instead of on advertising, and the team earns sponsorship that pays part of the bill. Sponsorship, commercial and brand income reached €820M in 2025.⁵

None of these needs Ferrari to sell more cars. All of them need the brand to stay rare and the cars to stay wanted. That is why I treat volume growth above about 2% a year as a cost to the brand, not a gain.

IVManagement

Benedetto Vigna has been chief executive since September 2021. He came from STMicroelectronics, where he ran the Analog, MEMS and Sensors Group, not from cars.⁵ John Elkann, chief executive of Exor and chairman of Stellantis, is executive chairman. Antonio Picca Piccon has been chief financial officer since July 2018, and he presented the 2025 plan.⁵¹⁵ In June 2026 the head of marketing and commercial, Enrico Galliera, left after sixteen years, and Massimiliano Di Silvestre, formerly head of BMW Group Italy, replaced him.²⁰

How they are paid, and what that pays them to do

Vigna’s total was €10.9M, 107 times the average Ferrari employee’s cost of €102,110. The ratio was 48 in 2021, his first partial year C (calculated).⁵ His bonus target is 150% of base salary and the cap is 225% of target, so the most he could earn was about €6.0M; he earned €5.85M, 97% of the cap C (calculated).⁵ That tells me the board set annual goals that were easy to reach in a strong year.

The stock awards matter more over time. From the 2025 to 2027 plan his target award is 300% of salary, up from 200%. It vests on three tests: 40% on total shareholder return against a peer group, 40% on adjusted EBITDA against the five-year plan, and 20% on carbon and diversity goals.⁵ The 2022 to 2024 plan paid 175% of target on the shareholder return test because Ferrari ranked first in its peer group.⁵ Half the shares vested must then be held for three years.⁵

Follow the incentive. EBITDA counts profit before depreciation, so it does not charge the plan for the €943M of capital spending or for the €421M of development costs Ferrari capitalised in 2025.⁵ A plan that rewards EBITDA and share-price rank pays for growth in reported profit and for a rising multiple, and it does not pay for cash per share. That is a common design and not a scandal. It does mean the people in charge are not paid to care about the gap between earnings and owner cash, which is the gap I care about most.

Their own money

Vigna held 30,204 shares in February 2026, worth €10.7M at the price, about one year of his 2025 pay C (calculated).⁵¹ Elkann held 34,740 shares himself; his family’s control runs through Exor’s 37.8M shares, worth €13.4B C (calculated). Piero Ferrari has the usufruct of 18.9M shares held in trust, worth €6.7B C (calculated).⁵¹ The owners who matter here have a great deal of their own money in. The managers have a modest amount.

What they did with capital over a full cycle

Ferrari’s capital record is simple. It spends on new models and plants, pays 35% to 40% of profit as dividends and buys back stock with most of the rest. From 2016 to 2024 it generated €5.2B of industrial free cash flow and bought back €2.3B of stock, and it paid €2.4B of dividends from 2017 to 2025; by its own count capital spending took 55% of the money and shareholders 45%.¹⁵ In 2026 to 2030 it plans €4.7B of capital spending and about €3.5B of buybacks, with the dividend raised to 40% of adjusted net profit.¹⁵ Shareholders approved €3.615 a share for 2025 in April, about €640M.¹⁹

Taken together the buybacks since 2021 are 19% above water at today’s price C (calculated).^98765161 That is a fair result, not a clever one. The company bought more as the price rose: it spent €1.33B in 2024 and 2025 at about €400 a share, more than in the three years before. One purchase stands out. In February 2025 Exor sold 6.67M Ferrari shares to institutions, and Ferrari bought 666,666 of them for €300M, €450 a share.⁵ The company’s cash paid its controlling shareholder a price 21% above today’s C (calculated). Exor took a 360-day lock-up on the rest, which ended in February 2026.⁵

Over the cycle I can judge, management has done what it said. Its 2025 guidance already beat the top of the 2026 profit targets it set in 2022, a year early.¹⁵ The record on capital is more ordinary. Spending has risen faster than revenue since 2021, and buybacks were heaviest near the top.

VFinancials

Ten years of numbers tell one story. Shipments rose 70% from 2016 to 2025, revenue 130% and operating profit 255%, so most of the gain came from price, mix and margin, not from more cars C (calculated).¹⁰⁵ The margin rose from 19.2% to 29.5%. Earnings per share rose faster again, from €2.11 to €8.96, because the share count fell.¹⁰⁵

Sources by year: 2016 to 2019 from the 2017, 2019 and 2020 annual reports, 2020 to 2025 from the 2022 to 2025 reports, and the TTM from the first-half 2026 report.^121110876514 Two caveats. The 2016 free cash flow uses the definition in force then and is not quite comparable. And 2018 profit includes the Italian Patent Box tax benefit, applied from the third quarter of 2018 with earlier years caught up, which is why net profit fell in 2019 while operating profit rose.¹¹

Capital spending has outrun depreciation

Ferrari has spent more on its plants and models than it has written off in every year since 2016, and the gap has been €200M to €320M a year since 2023 C (calculated).⁷⁵ Some of that builds for growth: a new paint shop, the e-Building for electric parts that opened in 2024, and development for cars that ship after 2030.⁵ But four new models a year is the cost of staying Ferrari, and the plan for 2026 to 2030 is €4.7B, about €0.94B a year, the same as 2025.¹⁵ I treat all of it as the capital needed to stand still. If a third of the plant spending is really growth, owner cash is about €100M a year higher than I show E (estimate).

What an owner can take out

Reported profit was €1,600M in 2025. Industrial free cash flow, Ferrari’s own measure, was €1,535M, and it looks close to profit. It is flattered by one thing. Customers paid in a lot of money ahead of delivery. Advances and deferred income together rose €310M in 2025, against €78M in 2024 C (calculated), much of it deposits on the F80.⁶⁵ That money is real, but it is not repeatable at that pace. As those cars ship, the deposits turn into revenue with no new cash.

So the number an owner can really take out was about €1.25B in 2025, 22% below reported profit E (estimate). On 175.3M shares at €355.10, the market value is €62.2B C (calculated).¹⁶¹ The owner-cash yield is 2.0% C (calculated). The earnings yield is 2.6%, at 38.5 times the €9.23 of diluted earnings in the twelve months to June C (calculated).⁵¹⁴ The gap between those two yields is where most of my disagreement with the price starts.

The first half of 2026 shows the same pattern. Industrial free cash flow was €929M, up 14%, and deferred income rose €276M in six months, mostly money received ahead under sponsorship and other agreements.¹³¹⁴ Ferrari paid €599M of dividends and €435M of buybacks in the half, €1.03B in total, more than the cash it made, so net industrial debt moved from €388M of net cash at March to €131M of net debt at June.¹³¹⁴ That is still almost no debt. It is not a cushion that grows.

The balance sheet

At 30 June 2026 Ferrari had €1,486M of cash and €3,166M of debt, but €1,549M of the net debt belongs to the US car-finance arm and is backed by €1,799M of loans to customers.¹⁴ Without the finance arm, net industrial debt was €131M, including leases.¹³ Bonds of €959M were outstanding at the end of 2025.⁵ I treat the finance arm as worth its book equity, about €250M E (estimate), and count it in the value.

This year so far, and the guidance

In the first half of 2026 revenue rose 6% to €3,786M, 8% at constant currency, operating profit rose 5% to €1,153M and diluted earnings per share rose 6% to €4.95.¹³ In July management raised 2026 guidance to revenue of about €7.60B, EBITDA of at least €2.97B, operating profit of at least €2.26B, diluted EPS of at least €9.68 and industrial free cash flow of at least €1.55B.¹³ That free cash flow guide is the same as 2025’s €1.54B. The third quarter is due on 3 November 2026.¹⁸

VIValuation

First, how this goes badly wrong

Before the numbers I ask what would most likely ruin the business or the investment, and work back from there. I see three ways.

1. Ferrari stops being rare. Volume creeps up, the waiting list shortens, used prices fall below list and the next launch has to be discounted. Every lever in section I depends on demand staying ahead of supply. This happens slowly, and the first sign is in used prices and in shipments, not in profit.
2. A wealth shock meets a launch gap. A deep fall in asset prices, a war or a tariff spiral, landing in a year when the line-up is between models. Ferrari’s operating profit fell 22% in 2020 C (calculated).¹⁰ A worse year would be survivable with almost no debt. It would hurt the multiple far more than the business.
3. A fine business at the wrong price. This is the most likely of the three. If Ferrari grows earnings 7% a year, close to its own plan, and the shares fall from 38 to 25 times earnings over ten years, an owner who pays €355.10 earns about 4% a year with dividends E (estimate). Nothing needs to go wrong at Maranello for that to happen.

The first two are risks to the business. The third is a risk only to the buyer, and it is the one the price controls.

What I cannot judge

I cannot judge whether an electric Ferrari will sell at Ferrari prices for a decade. I cannot judge how far the US will push tariffs, or whether Scuderia Ferrari wins again. I cannot see used-car prices across markets in any published series I trust. And I cannot know the right discount rate for a business this steady. Each of these is a range, not a number, so I show ranges and say which way each one cuts.

The model

I value owner cash flow over ten years and then at a steady growth rate. Each year is revenue times a margin built from EBITDA, less tax at 24% of operating profit, capital spending, stock pay and leases, and less 5% of new revenue for working capital E (estimate). Revenue starts at the €7.60B guided for 2026.¹³ I take off net industrial debt of €131M, add €250M for the finance arm and divide by 176.1M diluted shares at 30 June 2026 E (estimate).¹⁴¹³

The bear is a brand that gets more common: volume up, price discipline weaker, margins back to their 2019 to 2021 levels, an EBITDA margin of 34% to 36%. The base is management’s 2030 plan taken almost whole, with capital spending a little under its 12% ceiling, then growth a bit above the luxury average. The bull is the last decade repeated for another one, with margins two points higher still.

Discount rate. I use 8.5%, the same as the LVMH and ASML pages.³⁰³¹ The 10-year Bund yields 3.40%, and the implied equity premium is 4.20%, so an average euro stock needs about 7.6%.²³²⁴ I add a little because Ferrari is one brand, one plant and one family of buyers. Its five-year beta of 0.61 says it is less risky than the market, and many investors use a lower rate for that reason.²⁵ I do not, because a low beta measures how the price moved with the market, not how much a single luxury brand can lose. This choice drives the answer, and the sensitivity table shows by how much.

What the price needs

Reverse the model. At €355.10 and 8.5%, owner cash has to grow 15.6% a year for ten years from 2026’s €1.30B, and then 3% a year C (calculated). My base grows it 6.4% a year C (calculated). Management’s own plan points the same way as my base: about €8.0B of industrial free cash flow from 2026 to 2030, or about €1.6B a year, against €1.54B in 2025.¹⁵ The plan has free cash flow roughly flat for five years while capital spending absorbs the growth in EBITDA. The price assumes the opposite.

Value in the base builds as €12.3B from ten years of owner cash and €19.1B from the value after 2036, which is 61% of the total C (calculated). That end value is 18.7 times 2036 owner cash, a full luxury multiple, not a cautious one E (estimate).

Is my base too harsh? I tested the inputs one at a time. Margins first: taking management’s own floors in full, an EBITDA margin of 40% and depreciation of 9.4% of revenue, moves the base from €179 to €181. Growth next: revenue of €9.5B in 2030, 5% above the plan, adds a further €9 or so. Together they give €190 E (estimate). Neither is the problem. The rate is. Without my addition for one brand, at 7.6%, the base is €216; at 7.5% it is €221. Add the plan margins and the higher revenue and it is €229, still 36% under the price E (estimate). Only near 6% does the price come into reach: Ferrari’s beta of 0.61 with the same Bund and premium gives 3.40% plus 0.61 times 4.20%, or about 6.0%, and at that rate my base is €339 and the plan-beating version €361 E (estimate).²³²⁴²⁵ So I would call my 8.5% cautious for a business this steady, and not wrong. I keep it so that Ferrari, LVMH and ASML sit on one scale. A reader who prefers 7.5% should read the €221 row of the table, and a reader who prefers 6% should know the price is then close to my base.

Even at 6.5% and 3.5% growth forever, my base reaches €322, 9% under the price C (calculated). At 6.5% the price needs owner cash to grow about 9% a year for ten years, between my base and my bull C (calculated). So the disagreement between my numbers and the market’s is mostly about the rate. If Ferrari deserves to be valued like a long bond with growth attached, the price is about right. If it deserves the rate I use for LVMH and ASML, it is not.

The chart is built from Ferrari’s own weekly filings, so it shows what the company paid, day by day. On 9 October 2025, the day the 2030 plan came out, the average was 12.8% below the day before C (calculated).¹⁷ The lowest price it paid was €280.02 in January. The twelve-month low on Borsa Italiana was €269.00 in March and the high €373.00 in August, and the close is 32% above that low C (calculated).¹

The same euro, elsewhere

A euro in a 10-year Bund earns 3.40% with no risk of loss if held to maturity.²³ My base case for Ferrari returns 5.8% a year at today’s price E (estimate), 2.4 points more, for taking the risk of a single brand. The better test is the best comparable on this site. LVMH’s base case returns 8.2% a year at €383.85, and ASML’s 7.4%, both on the same 8.5% rate.³⁰³¹ By my numbers the same euro buys more future cash at LVMH than at Ferrari, though LVMH’s earnings are falling and Ferrari’s are not.

Quality and price are two questions

How good is the business? As good as any I have looked at: rising margins for a decade, almost no debt, customers who pay in advance, and protection that comes from the product itself. How good is the price? Poor, on my numbers. It is above my bull case. This looks like a great business at a price that asks for the last ten years to repeat, at a discount rate lower than I can defend. Those are two separate answers, and the first does not settle the second.

Why the market may be right

• Ferrari has beaten its own plans before. Its 2025 guidance already passed the top of the 2026 profit targets set in 2022.¹⁵ If it does that again, my base is too low.
• Investors pay up for certainty. Ferrari’s earnings are some of the most predictable in Europe, and a buyer who uses 6.5% needs about 9% growth a year to justify today’s price, less than my bull C (calculated).
• Pricing power may be wider than the plan shows. Personalization alone ran ahead of plan in 2026.¹³
• The consensus mean target from 12 analysts is $455.37, about €408 at the ECB rate, 15% above the price C (calculated).²⁶⁴

How the odds shrink

Multiplied out, all the parts of my base come true together about one time in four, which is why the base is a middle and not a promise. The price at my rate needs a chain that comes off about one time in thirty. A buyer at 6.5% needs fewer links. That is the simplest way I can put the disagreement.

The margin of safety

My margin-of-safety price is €134, 25% under my base value E (estimate). I use 25% rather than the 30% on some other pages because Ferrari’s cash flows have been unusually steady: its worst year since listing, 2020, cut operating profit by 22%.¹⁰ A cushion that covers one such year in value is enough. The price is 165% above it C (calculated). At €134, my base would return about 10% a year E (estimate).

Where this could be in 5 and 10 years

In the base, today’s €179 becomes about €227 in October 2031 and €266 in October 2036. For 2031 to hold, revenue reaches €9.4B and owner cash 20% of it. For 2036, revenue is €12.1B and owner cash €2.4B, with growth of 5% a year after 2030, a little above the 4.3% of the plan. Year 10 leans on the end value, which is 61% of today’s base E (estimate).

The bear and the bull differ on growth, margin and capital spending. In the bear, revenue grows 2.0% a year to 2030 and 2.5% after, capital spending takes 13.0% of revenue and owner cash is 14.5% of it, so a share is worth €140 in 2036. In the bull, revenue grows 9.0% a year, capital spending takes 10.5% and owner cash is 23.1%, which gives €497. The discount rate moves all three: at 9.0% the base is €245 in 2036, not €266 E (estimate).

The most likely way the base is wrong is the rate. I use 8.5%. At 7.5% the base is €221 today and €323 in 2036 E (estimate). At 7.5% the base return from €355.10 is still only 2.0% a year C (calculated).

These are estimates of value, not forecasts of the share price. The market price can sit above or below value for years.

VIIThe case for the price

What most people miss

Two things in the filings. First, Ferrari’s customers finance it. At June 2026 they had paid €747M in advances and deposits and another €701M of deferred income, €1.45B in all, up €249M in six months and up from €0.81B at the end of 2023 C (calculated).¹⁴⁶ That is money in hand for cars and services not yet delivered, and it is one reason a company that spends 13% of revenue on capital needs almost no debt.

Second, management under-promises. The 2025 guidance beat the top of the 2026 profit targets a year early, and 2026 guidance has already been raised once.¹⁵¹³ A plan from this team is a floor more often than a ceiling.

The bull case

The strongest case comes from the company. In July Vigna described healthy demand and “an order book that entirely covers 2027”.¹³ The 2030 plan calls the next five years “a story of product mix”: about €0.9B of extra operating profit from mix and price, with volume a small part.¹⁵ The 12 analysts in the S&P consensus have a mean target of $455.37.²⁶ Exor kept 21.3% after its 2025 sale, but a holding is a position, not a published view.⁵ I looked for published views on Ferrari from the investors I usually check and found none I could verify, so I leave them out.

Put plainly, the case is that rich people keep getting richer, Ferrari keeps rationing, and every new car costs more than the last. Two more launches a year than a normal car maker, personalization above a fifth of car revenue, and Formula 1 as free marketing make that a compounding machine.

Against reality

Today the business is doing what the case needs. Revenue grew 8% at constant currency in the first half, operating margin held at 30.5% and the order book covers 2027.¹³ If Ferrari grows revenue 9% a year for ten years, lifts EBITDA to 42% and holds capital spending to 10.5% of revenue, my bull gives €301, and at a 6.5% discount rate the price is possible E (estimate). That is three things at once, each above the company’s own plan. Today’s numbers are close on margin and short on cash: the plan has industrial free cash flow at about €1.6B a year to 2030, and the price at my rate needs €1.30B of owner cash to become about €5.5B by 2036 C (calculated).¹⁵

What a 10x would take. Ten times today is €3,551 a share and a market value of about €622B C (calculated). At 30 times earnings that needs €20.7B of net profit. At Ferrari’s 22.3% net margin over the last twelve months, that is €93B of revenue, 12.7 times today C (calculated). In ten years it means revenue growing 29% a year, three times Ferrari’s 9.7% from 2016 to 2025 C (calculated).¹⁰⁵ At €524,000 per car it means about 177,000 cars a year, 13 times today and nearly two thirds of what Porsche sells C (calculated).²⁸ A company that makes its money by refusing to sell more cars cannot get there. For Ferrari a 10x in a decade is close to impossible, and I would not build a case on it.

What they have to hit

Where I come down

The order book and the habit of beating plans moved me: my base takes the 2030 plan almost whole. The bull case did not move the price into range, because it needs the past decade to repeat and a lower rate at the same time. Two years of industrial free cash flow above €2B with capital spending under 11% of revenue would raise my values.

VIIIRisks, and what would change my view

What would change my view

What would raise my base value: free cash flow growing with EBITDA instead of being absorbed by capital spending, and evidence that the Luce adds buyers without lowering prices elsewhere. What would lower it: shipments rising without revenue per car, a weaker order book, or tariffs well above 15%. A lower share price would not change my base, but it would change the return. At the margin-of-safety price the same cash flows would return about 10% a year.